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Summary
Affiliating with political parties, voting, and building coalitions all contribute to the functioning of our political 
systems. One core component of this is social categorisation—being able to recognise others as fellow in-group members 
or members of the out-group. Without this capacity, we would be unable to coordinate with in-group members or avoid 
out-group members. Past research in social psychology and cognitive neuroscience examining social categorisation has 
suggested that one way to identify in-group members may be to directly compute the similarity between oneself and the 
target (dyadic similarity). This model, however, does not account for the fact that the group membership brought to bear 
is context-dependent. This review argues that a more comprehensive understanding of how we build representations of 
social categories (and the subsequent impact on our behaviours) must first expand our conceptualisation of social 
categorisation beyond simple dyadic similarity. Further, a generalisable account of social categorisation must also provide 
domain-general, quantitative predictions for us to test hypotheses about social categorisation. Here, we introduce an 
alternative model—one in which we infer latent groups of people through latent structure learning. We examine 
experimental evidence for this account and discuss potential implications for understanding the political mind.
Introduction
Our ability to affiliate with groups, choose allies, and build coalitions can be linked to the functioning and 
maintenance of political institutions, elections, and parties. Yet, these same abilities can also contribute to parochialism 
and political polarisation, which have been growing in recent years. For example, a text analysis of historical U.S. 
congressional speeches found that polarisation (operationalized as the ability of a third-party to correctly identify the 
political party of the speaker based on the text) has reached an all-time high [1]. Political tensions have likewise reached 
new highs; for example, people report levels of bias along political party lines that are similar to levels reported along 
racial lines [2].
One crucial precedent to cooperating in groups and organising into political movements is the ability to sort 
ourselves and others into in- and out-group members, or social categorisation. This is a fundamental capacity for group 
living [3], and a better understanding of the mechanisms underlying this capacity has potential implications for 
understanding political preferences, voting behaviour, and how to combat current political ills. This review offers a 
critical discussion of the current social categorisation literature with an emphasis on recent advances that conceptualise 
social categories as latent groups and social categorisation as latent structure learning. We conclude by discussing future 
directions and potential applications of latent structure learning in the context of understanding political behaviour.
Social Categorisation
In our interconnected social world where we encounter new people all the time, how do we accurately categorise 
others and choose our allies? One possibility suggested by social psychology research is to rely on dyadic similarity—we 
could compare our own social identities against those of the target person to infer similarity to the target, whether through 
direct or implied means (e.g., assigned team membership and audio-visual cues). This could be done through explicit 
signals; for a Trump supporter, seeing someone wear a “Make American Great Again” cap would be an indicator of 
sharing a social group membership with the target person (i.e., being Trump supporters). We can also rely on other visual 
cues such as skin tone and gender to infer group membership (e.g., [4]). Other studies have demonstrated how children 
rely on familiar accents to choose between social targets [5]. Many other studies of intergroup relations have directly 
sorted participants into explicit, minimal teams to demonstrate in-group favouritism [6]. Even the most contrived, 
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assigned, explicit team memberships can trigger intergroup bias and conflict, as Sherif [7] demonstrated in his seminal 
Robbers Cave study, where boys from similar backgrounds who were unfamiliar with one another were separated into 
groups at a summer camp; after they bonded within their groups, the introduction of competitive camp activities resulted 
in general intergroup aggression (e.g., name-calling, flag burning, stealing, etc.). 
Of course, similarity need not be inferred along a single dimension or absolute. Our social selves contain a 
multitude of social group memberships, and the combination of one’s group memberships can also be important. For 
example, research in intersectionality highlights how racial identity and its impact on one’s welfare cannot be considered 
independently of gender and class [8,9]. Particular mixes of different social group memberships (e.g., being African-
American and female) can lead to specific adverse outcomes [10]. Children express strong pro-White biases when 
presented with Black and White faces, but these biases manifest at different levels for males and females [11]. 
Furthermore, people can also perceive gradations of similarity. For example, religious children perceive a religious 
character (albeit one of a different religion) as more similar to themselves than a non-religious character, and this 
similarity correlates with reported liking for the character [12]. Dyadic similarity based on gradation can also be found in 
political science theories such as simple spatial voting models, wherein voters support candidates with whom their policy 
preferences directly align the most [13]. Across all of these, calculations of relationships are dyadic in nature; how one 
perceives another person is affected only by the degree of similarity between oneself and the target person. Strong 
considerations of dyadic similarity along salient dimensions may drive social preference and inference of group 
memberships.
Yet, even though dyadic similarity may remain the same across time and space, our understanding of in- and 
out-group membership is mutable; we have the ability to reassemble and reorganise into superordinate groups and 
different coalitions when necessary [14,15]. Indeed, the group membership(s) we bring to bear in any given situation is 
context-dependent [16]. Additionally, whereas past studies of group membership have typically provided some form of 
accessible cues to group membership (e.g., [17]), we do not always have direct access to other people’s group 
memberships. Even if there are visual cues to group membership, these may not be relevant to the dimension along which 
we sort others into coalitional in- and out-group members. Given our ability to flexibly reshape “us” and “them” as per 
the context of the situation and without needing explicit visual cues, a simple account of dyadic similarity does not suffice 
to account for our diverse social behaviours.
Previous theories further highlight potential examples of how context affects social categorisation. Some 
accounts, such as Optimal Distinctiveness Theory, state that specific social identities are made salient through a balance 
of resolving the inner conflict of needing to both belong to a group and individuality [18], and these social identities 
might be the dimensions along which we divide the world. Thus, dyadic similarity between us and a target person may 
not change across different contexts, but being amongst people whose group memberships highlight one particular 
dimension on which we and the target differ may lead us to group the target with the out-group, while a different 
composition of others may highlight dimensions that we and the target share and make us regard the target as an in-group 
member. Additionally, Campbell [19] identified sharing a common fate, or the degree of shared outcomes amongst group 
members, in addition to similarity as core components of entitativity. Shared fate may serve as a contextual effect. Sherif 
[7] also demonstrated the importance of functional relations between groups (i.e., whether or not the groups were in 
competition or in cooperation) as an input to social categorisation. This is captured in self-categorisation theory, which 
posits that contexts and environments play a role in social categorisation; someone whom one may infer as a fellow group 
member in one context may not be considered an in-group member in another context [16]. It may not be a person’s 
similarities on preferences, traits, and characteristics that are crucial to inferring that person’s social group in relation to 
one’s own, but rather the interaction between the immediate context and the dyadic similarity along a dimension made 
salient by the context that allow for social group inference. Yet, these accounts still sidestep any description of the exact 
computations allowing for the flexibility with which we divide the world into “us” and “them”. 
These exact computations are important because a generalisable account of social categorisation needs to 
provide quantifiable predictions that can then be tested. While theories such as those highlighted in the previous 
paragraph qualitatively describe the context-dependence of social categorisation, they proffer no quantitative predictions 
about the effects of particular contexts on the resulting categorisations. In other words, a computational account of social 
categorisation would allow us to input quantitative “settings” (e.g., the degree to which people under consideration are 
similar to us, the number of people under consideration, etc.) and generate quantitative predictions. This is required for us 
to develop concrete hypotheses about when and why people perceive a target as an in-group member in one context but 
not the next. While dyadic similarity, in a particular form, can provide quantitative predictions (e.g., summing the number 
of similarities between oneself and a target), these calculations are dyadic in nature and predict the same outcome in 
every context. In contrast, a generalisable computational model would allow us to produce predictions about the degree of 
similarity between targets and perceivers that is required for perceivers to view targets as in-group members. Finally, a 
computational account would allow us to model group affiliation and social influence across larger social networks. 
Without a computational formalisation of our theories, we fail to understand mechanisms and the exact contexts under 
which the in-group or out-group divisions can occur.
Latent Structure Learning
Rather than thinking purely in terms of categorical social groups, we could abstract away and instead start the 
literature about statistical processes through which groups or clusters of data points can be determined [20]; under these 
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processes, observations sharing more features or characteristics with one another are assigned to the same cluster. While 
some cluster analysis methods require us to predefine the number of clusters (e.g., k-means clustering [21]), others infer 
clusters by allowing for probability distributions over the different possible distributions of the data (e.g., Dirichlet 
processes [22]). If it is the case that we cluster social others and ourselves in a similar manner to how we might 
statistically determine clusters in observed data points, then accounts of social group inference incorporating these 
computations may help us both infer social groups while simultaneously determining the salient dimension along which 
we draw social divisions. 
Applying this to social categorisation, we may be able to infer latent groups, or clusters of people [23-24]. Under 
this account, we can use our observations of others’ choice patterns to infer what the most probable group configuration 
of people is across multiple individuals (Fig. 1). This can be determined using Bayes rule, in which our posterior (the 
group configuration given the choice patterns) is the product of a prior (the probability of the group configurations) and a 
likelihood (the choice patterns given the group configuration). We can set our prior using a Chinese restaurant process 
[25]. This clustering method is analogous to customers walking into a Chinese restaurant with an infinite seating capacity 
and tables; in this case, our tables are analogous to groups and customers are analogous to choices. The probability of a 
new customer coming in and sitting down at a particular table is a function of the number of people already seated at that 
table and a dispersion parameter. This dispersion parameter governs the probability that the new customer will be seated 
at an empty table (i.e., as it approaches infinity, each person will be assigned to their own table for one). While there can 
be an infinite number of tables in theory, a “rich get richer” dynamic will favour more parsimonious groupings [26].
We can then compare these possible group configurations to the observed choice patterns; our likelihood will 
dictate that the more similar the observed choice behaviour is to a hypothesised grouping, the higher the probability 
assigned to that grouping. In other words, if two people, Annie and Betsy, always choose the same movies, while you and 
a third person, Carol, always choose the same set of movies, albeit one that is different from the set that Annie and Betsy 
choose, then the most likely group configuration is one wherein you are grouped with Carol and Annie is paired with 
Betsy. If all four of you were to then choose completely different movies, this observation would weaken the probability 
assigned to this particular group configuration. By inferring a probability distribution over all possible latent groupings 
given the number of people under consideration, this model allows us to infer an infinite number of groups over an 
infinite number of people but eliminates the need for predetermining (1) the number of social groups and (2) the 
dimensions along which one carves the relevant social groups. 
It is important to note that this account does not necessitate the existence of one or more out-group(s). For 
example, if everyone is identical in his/her choices (e.g., everyone, including you, supports the same taxation rates), the 
model would assign the highest probability to a grouping where everyone is assigned to the same group as you. At the 
other extreme, if each person is distinct enough (e.g., each person prefers a very different set of taxation policies), then 
the generative model would assign the highest probability to the grouping where each person is assigned to his/her own 
groups. Thus, given the right context, a perceiver may identify everyone as be a fellow member of the in-group. 
Recent studies have designed a task to test this account [27]. Participants were asked in a task to learn about the 
preferences of new people. Participants stated their own preference (“yes” or “no”) on a political issue (e.g., “Should 
genetically modified foods be labelled?”) and then guessed and learned through feedback the preferences of three other 
people on that same issue. After doing this for a series of different issues, participants reached a test trial where they had 
to choose between two of the three people’s “mystery” choices. Participants were told that these two people had informed 
experimenters of their preferences on a new political issue, but the participant was privy to neither the issue nor the 
people’s chosen stances. Given that participants had just learned about the preferences of these two people on a series of 
other political issues, with whom would the participant rather ally? In effect, participants were being asked to make an 
“ally-choice” and ally with one of the two people given their knowledge of these people’s preferences on the previous 
political issues.
This particular task structure effectively allows one to pit the predictions of the two models—dyadic similarity 
and latent structure learning—against each other. At each ally-choice trial, participants (You in Fig. 2) were forced to 
choose between two people (A and B in Fig. 2) who were equally similar to them (i.e., each had agreed with the 
participant on an equal number of political issues). According to the dyadic similarity account, participants should show 
ambivalence between the two people because they are equally similar to the participant. More importantly, this account 
posits that participants’ choices should not be influenced by the presence of a third person, because the participants’ 
views of A and B are affected only by their direct agreement to A and B, respectively. In contrast, the latent structure 
learning account would predict that participants’ choices between A and B would be affected by the presence of a third 
person, because the location of this person within the agreement space affects which latent groups are inferred as being 
most probable. In this particular experimental instantiation of the task, this third person, C, agrees more with B than with 
A (Fig. 2). When C agrees a lot with the participant (e.g., agreeing on a majority of the political issues; Fig. 2a), the 
participant infers a latent group consisting of him/herself, C, and B (C’s higher rate of agreement with B allows for the 
inclusion of B), and this makes the participant more likely choose B over A. However, when C agrees very little with the 
participant (e.g., disagreeing on a majority of the political issues; Fig. 2b), the participant should be more likely choose A 
over B, because the participant is infers being left out of the latent group that consists of B and C. 
In a series of experiments using a variety of political issues, participants’ behaviours reflected the inference of 
and reliance on these latent groups in order to choose political allies; the presence of C affected how participants chose 
between A and B [27-28]. Moreover, these latent groups affected trait inferences made about A, B, and C. When 
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participants inferred being in the same latent group as a particular person (Fig. 2a), they rated that person as more 
competent, moral, and likeable compared to when they inferred being in a separate group from that same person (Fig. 2b). 
Furthermore, even when participants could rely solely on dyadic similarity, the latent groups affected their choices. In a 
final experiment, participants were randomly assigned to one of two coloured teams at the beginning of the experiment. 
At each ally-choice trial, A and B were shown in coloured boxes, which reflected A’s and B’s own team memberships. 
Unbeknownst to the participant, A was always labelled as a member of the same team as the participant, while B was 
always labelled as a member of the opposite team. If participants stopped relying on latent groups when provided with a 
clear, easy alternative of explicit dyadic similarity in the form of team memberships, then they should choose A on every 
ally-choice trial. Instead, participants were still influenced by the degree of agreement between themselves and C in their 
ally-choice trials. That is not to say that participants never relied on these explicit teams. When participants were in the 
same latent group as B (the opposite coloured team member; Fig. 2a), they chose B over A about 50 percent of the time 
(at chance). However, when explicit team labels and the inferred latent group were in agreement (i.e., when the 
participant, who was already on the same team as A, inferred not being in the same latent group as B; Fig. 2b), 
participants were even more likely than in other experiments to side with A. In other words, the explicit groups reinforced 
the inferred latent groups. Within the latent structure learning framework, we can model the existence of these explicit 
groups through the dispersion parameter in the prior (e.g., participants may believe a priori that there exists only two 
groups). It is worthwhile noting that these findings are not specific to the political domain; participants exhibit these 
behavioural effects with cinematic preferences [23], and in large social networks, these inferred latent groups are more 
influential than one’s self-reported friendship network for predicting future behaviour [29]. Thus, these experiments and 
social network analyses demonstrate that latent structure learning may be a more comprehensive behavioural account of 
social categorisation. 
Neural Correlates of Social Categorisation
Recent work extends these accounts, dyadic similarity and latent structure learning, to the brain. How might the 
brain track social group memberships in the environment? One candidate for dyadic similarity is the medial prefrontal 
cortex/pregenual anterior cingulate (mPFC/pgACC). Thinking about one’s own, and similar others’, traits, mental states, 
perspectives, and characteristics elicits activation in this area [30-31]. Additionally, consideration of close others (e.g., 
family, a group of close friends, etc.) elicits activation in these areas [32]. Tracking dyadic similarity requires 
understanding others’ traits and states relative to one’s own to calculate the degree of similarity between oneself and the 
target. Taken together, this area could compute this difference between others and oneself to track the similarity (or 
difference) between oneself and another person at any time, making it a good candidate for tracking changes in dyadic 
similarity. Additionally, understanding the similarities between oneself and the individual under consideration could be a 
good proxy for whether or not one is in the same group as that person. 
On the other hand, tracking latent groups may not require such self-referential processes. A study that asked 
participants to categorise foods and restaurants to determine which clusters caused illness found that clustering of causal 
structures was updated in areas not typically associated with self-referential processes, such as the right anterior insula 
(rAI; [33]). It is important, however, to note that social categorisation is unlike other forms of categorisation in that it 
requires one to additionally classify oneself as a part of the group [16]. For example, one may sort plants into groups of 
fruits or vegetables without needing to sort oneself into a fruit or vegetable group, but to sort other Democrats and 
Republicans as in- or out-group members, one must first group oneself as either Democrat or Republican. Differential 
activity in the rAI has also been linked to categorising ambiguous race faces and political ideology [34]. In a parcellation 
of the insula, the anterior insula was found to be connected with the anterior cingulate cortex, amygdala, and the 
dorsolateral prefrontal cortex [35]; these areas have also been linked to categorisation along racial lines [17, 36]. The rAI 
is well-connected to communicate between areas that would be important for tracking social latent groups.
In a fMRI adaptation of the latent structure learning task described in the previous section, activity in the rAI 
was correlated with tracking the probability of each individual’s membership in the same latent group as the participant 
[28]. Additionally, activity in the pgACC was correlated with tracking and updating dyadic similarity with each 
individual. Perhaps more importantly, however, the variability in the signal from the rAI, but not the pgACC, was found 
to improve model predictions of variability in participants’ actual choice behaviour on the ally-choice trial. Furthermore, 
variability in the rAI was much better explained by the latent structure model than by dyadic similarity. This was not true 
for the pgACC and the dyadic similarity model. Thus, while latent structure learning model relies, to some degree, on 
similarity between people, there is a difference between how the brain tracks dyadic similarity and latent groups. Second, 
this demonstrates that while the brain simultaneously tracks both dyadic similarity and latent groups, only the variability 
in the signal from the area tracking the latent groups actually improves predictions of behaviour.
The Political Mind
This latent groups account provides specific, testable, quantitative hypotheses about how different contexts will 
result in different inferred groupings, which affect whom we perceive as fellow group members and how we choose 
allies. This model is generalisable across situations and scales with the number of people under consideration. Indeed, if 
we reframe social categorisation as latent structure learning, we can move beyond thinking about political allegiance as a 
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static, immutable affiliation and rather as a changeable, evolving function of all possible current political party 
allegiances. Taken together, what does this imply for our understanding of political behaviour and organisation?
First, the latent groups account has implications for the way in which voting behaviour should be modelled. 
Common political science accounts of voter behaviour, such as a simple spatial voting model [37], assume that voters will 
choose the political candidate with whom their preferences directly align the best and these choices should not be 
influenced by the stances of other voters or the stances of other candidates. Yet, the latent groups account suggests that 
voting behaviour is much more complex; how voters perceive all candidates will affect how they view any individual 
candidate because it affects which groups are inferred and which divisions are made relevant. Indeed, it is worth 
reiterating that only signal variability from the brain region tracking latent groups improved predictions of variability in 
actual choice behaviour on the ally-choice trial [28]. This demonstrates the importance of latent structures in these ally-
choice decisions. Nonetheless, the account has implications for how we can interpret recent political events. While the 
2016 U.S. Presidential election was ultimately driven by economic factors, sexism and racism [39], the alignment of 
Clinton with racial minorities (B and C in Fig. 2b), a group whose views on immigration reform, criminal justice reform, 
etc. differ from Whites, may have served to help additionally push undecided White voters towards Trump (A in Fig. 2b). 
In other words, rather than maximising the number of policy stances on which a candidate and target voters agree, 
political strategists also need to consider the context under which important undecided voters are viewing the electoral 
race (e.g., how a candidate is viewed with respect to other voting blocs as well as other candidates matters). More broadly 
speaking, however, how factions align to form these latent groups should not be ignored, especially when voters are 
strongly undecided between candidates, and the model may have use for predicting shifts in voting trends.
The account also has implications for how we think about the adoption of political preferences. Investigations of 
the transmission of political preferences and mobilisation (e.g., [40,41]) typically conceptualise social influence as 
stemming from direct neighbours and friends in a given person’s social network. In contrast, the latent groups account 
focuses on how inferred, hidden groups can potentially exert a more powerful social influence compared to the influences 
of friends and family [29]. If hidden communities in a social network, rather than a voter’s direct social connections, exert 
more influence on the voter’s political preferences and activeness, then strategies to increase transmission of political 
preferences and mobilisation of voters may be better off harnessing the power of these latent groups rather than rely on 
influence via direct ties. 
This is not to say that dyadic similarity accounts and spatial voting models are inaccurate; the neuroimaging 
results demonstrated that the brain tracks and updates both dyadic similarity and latent groups simultaneously [28]. This 
is in line with the final experiment in [27], where participants utilised both explicit labels (i.e., dyadic similarity) and 
latent groups. Specifically, when the latent group inference and dyadic similarity were aligned to favour one particular 
person, participants were even more likely to ally with that person. Thus, there is clear potential to leverage both dyadic 
similarity and latent groups simultaneously in political contexts to derive greater identification with the party and drive 
voting behaviour.
Further, the latent groups account strengthens our understanding of current levels of perceived polarisation. The 
model assigns higher probabilities to group configurations where similarities within groups are greater. Indeed, recent 
findings in political science demonstrate that political party identities are increasingly “sorted” and homogenous, such 
that racial, religious, and other social identities have become aligned with political party membership [42]. Such a high 
degree of intragroup similarity would result in high probabilities assigned to the existence of distinct, separate groups, 
and this may contribute to the meta-perceptions that exacerbate misperceived polarization [43]. Moreover, the model 
suggests interventions that could allow for meaningful interactions between opposing groups. Moderately conservative 
voters can help serve as the bridge between Democrats and other conservative voters (i.e., serving as C in Fig. 2a), and 
over time, genuine diversification of the voter bases of political parties will lead to the real possibility of depolarisation. 
It is important to note that decreasing the homogeneity of political parties need not decrease their coalitional 
power. Because the latent groups account dictates a context-dependent search for the most probable group, the resulting 
inferred group can exhibit intragroup cohesion without necessarily exhibiting strong ties. Similarly, sociology research 
has demonstrated that loosely tied groups can exhibit strong cohesiveness within social networks [43], and political 
coalitions are no different. Thus, through its properties, the model accounts for effects observed in the political science 
and sociology literatures and also offers potential paths to alleviating these problems.
Finally, the examples mentioned thus far relate primarily to the domain of Anglo-American politics, where a 
winner-takes-all system favours a distribution of power across only two political parties. This status quo of binary choices 
in elections may enforce an idiosyncratic notion of the existence of two groups. It is worth restating, however, that the 
model does not necessitate the existence of only two groups. Thus, this model still has relevance for multi-party 
democracies such as Germany. It may even be the case that in these coalition-driven democracies, latent groups are even 
more relevant for political strategists to consider. 
Conclusions
Social categorisation underlies many political behaviours, including choosing allies, affiliating with political 
parties, etc. Through understanding how we sort ourselves into “us” and “them”, we can gain traction on understanding 
our social and political world. Here, we introduced evidence for reframing social categorisation as a form of latent 
structure learning and discussed how this latent groups model provides insights into the political mind. We hope that 
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through greater adaptation of this account as a form of social categorisation, many fields, including psychology, can move 
forward in their understanding the flexible nature of social influence, social groups, and social networks.
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Figure and table captions
Figure 1: A schematic of latent structure learning. Columns of coloured boxes on the bottom right represent all possible 
group configurations given three people, ranging from all three being in separate groups (indicated by the three 
differently coloured boxes) to all three people being in one group (indicated by all three people being assigned to one 
colour). We can use observed behavior (e.g., the movie preferences of each person) to update a prior in order to generate 
a posterior distribution over all possible groupings and infer the most probable latent grouping of people. In this case, the 
most likely grouping is one where all three people are all in one group together. 
Figure 2: An abstract representation of similarity space. Represented are two scenarios in which you are equally similar to 
Annie and Betsy each, and Carol is more similar to Betsy than to Annie. (a) Carol is very similar to you, so you infer a 
latent structure consisting of yourself, Carol, and Betsy. (b) Carol is not very similar to you, so you infer a latent structure 
consisting of only Carol and Betsy (you are not in the group).
Figure 3. fMRI results from [28]. Whole-brain contrast (FWE-corrected p < 0.05) of parametric modulators: dyadic 
similarity model (green; pgACC) and latent groups model (red; rAI).
Figures
Figure 1.
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Figure 2: An abstract representation of similarity space. Represented are two scenarios in which you are 
equally similar to Annie and Betsy each, and Carol is more similar to Betsy than to Annie. (a) Carol is very 
similar to you, so you infer a latent structure consisting of yourself, Carol, and Betsy. (b) Carol is not very 
similar to you, so you infer a latent structure consisting of only Carol and Betsy (you are not in the group). 
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Figure 3. fMRI results from [28]. Whole-brain contrast (FWE-corrected p < 0.05) of parametric modulators: 
dyadic similarity model (green; pgACC) and latent groups model (red; rAI). 
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